# Faith-Based Diplomacy: A Pathway to Marginalizing Al-Qa`ida

by

Lieutenant Colonel Brent A. Grometer
United States Air Force

United States Army War College
Class of 2013

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
xx-03-2013	STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT	

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Faith-Based Diplomacy: A Pathway to Marginalizing Al-Qa`ida	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Lieutenant Colonel Brent A. Grometer	5e. TASK NUMBER
United States Air Force	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
Raymond A. Millen Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute	

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Word Count: 7,444

14. ABSTRACT
The U.S. government, influenced by a secular tradition of separating church and state, is challenged by the intersections between the role of religion in foreign policy and the demand to deal with faith-based tensions and significant conflicts around the world, particularly al-Qa`ida. The U.S. policy approach to al-Qa`ida and religious extremism over the last twelve years is an approach that overwhelmingly omits faith-based diplomacy. This paper examines a faith-based policy approach to defeating al-Qa`ida: first, addressing shortfalls and limitations in past and current National Security Strategy; second, characterizing the current global nature of the al-Qa`ida organization, including its theology and ideology; and, third, recommending faith-based policy initiatives, including the advocacy for greater U.S. policy and strategy emphasis on the promotion of religious freedom worldwide.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Religion, True Believer, Salafi, Al Qaeda, Jihad, Osama Bin Laden, Zawahiri, Religious Freedom, AQAP, AQIM

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU	UU	40	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER *(Include area code)*

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Faith-Based Diplomacy: A Pathway to Marginalizing Al-Qa`ida

by

Lieutenant Colonel Brent A. Grometer
United States Air Force

Raymond A. Millen
Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute
Project Adviser

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Abstract

Title: Faith-Based Diplomacy: A Pathway to Marginalizing Al-Qa`ida

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 40

Word Count: 7,444

Key Terms: Religion, True Believer, Salafi, Al Qaeda, Jihad, Osama Bin Laden, Zawahiri, Religious Freedom, AQAP, AQIM

Classification: Unclassified

The U.S. government, influenced by a secular tradition of separating church and state, is challenged by the intersections between the role of religion in foreign policy and the demand to deal with faith-based tensions and significant conflicts around the world, particularly al-Qa`ida. The U.S. policy approach to al-Qa`ida and religious extremism over the last twelve years is an approach that overwhelmingly omits faith-based diplomacy. This paper examines a faith-based policy approach to defeating al-Qa`ida: first, addressing shortfalls and limitations in past and current National Security Strategy; second, characterizing the current global nature of the al-Qa`ida organization, including its theology and ideology; and, third, recommending faith-based policy initiatives, including the advocacy for greater U.S. policy and strategy emphasis on the promotion of religious freedom worldwide.

Faith-Based Diplomacy: A Pathway to Marginalizing Al-Qa`ida

The reality is that religion has power. And that power can either be used creatively or destructively. . . . I do believe that religion is indeed the major cause of much conflict in the world today. And, I would say, if it is a cause, it must also be the cure.

—Andrew White, President and CEO,
Foundation for Reconciliation of the Middle East[1]

Religion and Its Challenges

Overall, 84 percent of the world's inhabitants, estimated at 6.9 billion, identify with a religion, according to a 2012 study issued by the *Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life*.[2] The *Encyclopedia of Religion* states, "Religion is the organization of life around the depth dimensions of experience—varied in form, completeness, and clarity in accordance with the environing culture."[3] Definitions of religion are as broad and widely interpreted as the *Encyclopedia of Religion*. Peter Edge, author of *Religion and Law*, informs: "Where do we find 'the' English definition of religion? In fact, there is no such single definition—rather a body of related definitions which depend upon the context in which they occur."[4] Adding a further dimension, Edge states "There are difficulties in defining religion which are common to any consideration of the term which is not, itself, based in the discipline of an exclusive religion."[5] Among the complexities of doing so, Edge ultimately yields a working definition: "religion consists of statements about metaphysical reality, and beliefs and practices flowing from such statements."[6] Provided the broad definitions, interpretations, and individual value and expression of religion, it is not surprising religion is tied to conflict around the world: sectarian violence in the Middle East; religious nationalism in South Asia; threats of religious extremism in the West; interreligious battles in Africa; and religious suppression in East Asia.[7] Moreover, several of these regional areas are presently influenced by al-Qa'ida, a global militant

Islamist organization and its affiliates. In the 2012 *Strategic Defense Guidance*,

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, clearly indicates the U.S. priority for defeating this

transnational organization. "It [the Joint Force] will preserve our ability to conduct the

missions we judge most important to protecting core national interests: defeating al-

Qa`ida and its affiliates and succeeding in current conflicts."[8] The U.S. government,

influenced by a secular tradition of separating church and state, is challenged by the

intersections between the role of religion in foreign policy and the demand to deal with

faith-based tensions and significant conflicts around the world, particularly al-Qa`ida. In

a 2007 interview, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright provided insight to

reasons for this challenge when asked why diplomats and world leaders are "tone deaf"

to the power of religion:

> It's not a matter of not understanding or having their own personal faith.
> But, what had happened is that I think there was a sense that certain
> conflicts were so complicated, that to bring God and religion into them was
> an additional complicating factor, because there were so many diverse
> ideas. And if there's one thing that always gets people excited, it's their
> different interpretations of religion. So, the best thing people thought was,
> you know, this is hard enough. Let's not bring God and religion into it.[9]

Secretary Albright further commented, "And, I feel especially now that the opposite

needs to be true--is that in order to try to resolve conflicts we need to find the common

aspects of the three great Abrahamic religions."[10] The Secretary's response, albeit an

informing perspective from the former highest-ranking U.S. diplomat, is simple and

intuitive when considering the challenges of incorporating faith in a national policy

approach, particularly to religious issues and conflicts. Her insight, however, uniquely

highlights the underlying U.S. policy approach to complex religious issues, specifically

al-Qa`ida and religious extremism over the last twelve years—an approach that

overwhelmingly "leaves God and religion out of it." This research paper advocates a

faith-based policy approach to marginalizing al-Qa`ida: first, addressing shortfalls and limitations in past and current national policy; second, characterizing the current global nature of the al-Qa`ida organization, including its theology and ideology; and, third, recommending faith-based policy initiatives to sideline al-Qa`ida. If implemented properly, a faith-based approach compliments the additional instruments of national power.

<center>2002 and 2010 National Security Strategies</center>

Evidence of the complexities and challenges of countering, much less defeating, al-Qa`ida is apparent through comparisons of the 2002 and, most recently published, 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) documents. As articulated in the 2002 NSS, "The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents."[11] The 2002 strategy posture broadly characterized al-Qa`ida as simply a terrorist organization with political motivation without an associated face, religion, or ideology. In contrast, Quintan Wiktorowicz, in his 2002 book, *Global Jihad*, more descriptively characterizes al-Qa`ida as "the self-anointed foot soldiers of God, embroiled in a divine cosmic struggle between good and evil, the righteous and the sinful, Islamic truth and western ignorance."[12] Wiktorowicz assessed the Bush administration response a year following the September 11, 2001 attacks as too narrowly focused: "The U.S. response targeted radical Islamic terrorists who, as President Bush put it, were 'traitors to their own faith, trying in effect, to hijack Islam itself."[13] He further comments that President Bush, and other world leaders, dismissed al-Qaeda as part of the "lunatic fringe, outside the boundaries of Islam," resulting in a prevailing national strategy designed to kill or

<center>3</center>

immobilize the "violent religious usurpers and so end terrorism."[14] Wiktorowicz

presciently foresaw enduring challenges and complexities in U.S. attempts to defeat al-

Qa`ida. He surmised: "If al-Qaeda is dismantled as an organized enterprise, will Islamic

terrorism disappear? The administration seems to think so, and is betting its future

national security on an anti-terrorism policy directed at destroying al-Qaeda's

infrastructure and eliminating its leadership."[15] Wiktorowicz additionally explained that

an enemy like al-Qa`ida is not eradicated through military operations and law

enforcement dragnets alone, since there are others to assume the place of the fallen.

Wiktorowicz concludes the violent true believer is only stopped if the ideas nurturing

violence and terrorism are discredited.[16] Comparing the 2002 and 2010 NSS reveals al-

Qa`ida remains resilient and not as easy to eradicate as previously assumed.

> Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt down the
> Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not only this battlefield on which we will
> engage terrorists. Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells
> in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and
> across Asia.[17] –2002 NSS

> Afghanistan and Pakistan: This is the epicenter of violent extremism
> practiced by al-Qa`ida. The danger from this region will only grow if its
> security slides backward, the Taliban controls large swaths of Afghanistan,
> and al-Qa`ida is allowed to operate with impunity.[18] –2010 NSS

Since 2002, some progress was made in weakening al-Qa`ida's core strength, depriving

the organization of training bases in Afghanistan and sequestering it in Pakistan; but the

organization core and affiliates expanded operations to Iraq, the Maghreb and Arabian

Peninsula. Progress does not mean the dissolution of al-Qa`ida is imminent. Vigilance

and the distinctive well-balanced application of lethal power against al-Qa`ida remain

prudent measures but cannot endure in marginalizing the organization. As the 2010

NSS reveals, the original Global War on Terror has evolved: "We will always seek to

delegitimize the use of terrorism and to isolate those who carry it out. Yet this is not a

global war against a tactic—terrorism or a religion—Islam. We are at war with a specific

network, al-Qa`ida, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United

States, our allies, and partners."[19] Yet, does this strategy focus on al-Qa`ida's center of

gravity, popular support—those small portion of supporters who aid in "legitimizing" and

"galvanizing" the violent extremists—or simply carve away the edges?[20] After all, like the

Cold War, the conflict with al-Qa`ida is about conflicting ideologies—a war of ideas.

Ultimately, it is Muslims, however, that must persuade Muslims that liberal democratic

ideals are more aligned with Islam than al-Qa`ida radicalism. In a lingering war of

attrition through lethal means, without sincere effort to understand and explain al-

Qa`ida—its theological, ideological, and organizational elements—the United States will

inevitably continue to formulate future policy and strategy with vain attempts to

marginalize al-Qa`ida extremism as an enduring priority.

There is tremendous credence in Wiktorowicz' aforementioned claim of fruitless

attempts to defeat a true believer with brute force. Until the ideas, motives, and

aspirations of a fanatic or fanatical movement are understood, they are extremely

difficult to marginalize. Over sixty years ago, Eric Hoffer gave the world a literary gem,

The True Believer, on understanding social thought. Hoffer's work is a hallmark work for

any strategist attempting to understand the complexities of a fanatic or, in this case,

extremist enemy. With ambitions to reign as a burgeoning caliphate, the motivations of

al-Qa`ida members closely resonate with Hoffer's description of a 'true believer': "Their

innermost craving is for a new life—a rebirth—or, failing this, a chance to acquire new

elements of pride, confidence, hope, a sense of purpose and worth by an identification

with a holy cause."[21] Hoffer's insights matter because understanding this level of personal motivation or justification of ideas is what enables marginalization of an enemy insurgent—to understand individual aims, recruitment strategies, and organizational goals, growth, and sustainment. Understanding the enemy, after all, is one of the principal elements of Sun Tzu's strategic imperative for defeating any enemy. Thomas Farr's and Dennis Hoover's *The Future of U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy* argues that terrorist movements thrive in part on the appeal of ideas.[22] Their argument is further strengthened by a recurrent observation. While leaders may be captured or killed, communications disrupted or geographic regions cleared of terrorist affiliates, "the ideas which attract recruits remain operative."[23] Farr and Dennis further argue, "Islamist terrorism in its various guises is distinctive, and possesses a particular staying power, because of its appeal to religious obligation."[24] This obligation is inextricably linked to a greater vision for the al-Qa`ida organization and one persisting to evolve. Scholars continue to analyze and discuss al-Qa`ida's past and future jihadist aims, particularly when considering the events and context surrounding Arab Spring and Osama bin Laden's death in 2011. The following provides a brief outline of al-Qa`ida's current organizational status, with an enduring theological foundation, an evolving ideology, and a dynamic organizational structure.

<div align="center">Al-Qa`ida Today</div>

Theology

Islamic fundamentalism is a broad term referring to an individual seeking to strictly follow the two fundamental sources of Islam—the Quran and Sunna.[25] The Quran, the literal word of God as transmitted to the prophet Mohammed in Arabic, provides rules for human activities including economics, family relations, politics, and

<div align="center">6</div>

religious practice.[26] Fundamentalists believe Muslims should apply the principals of the Quran to every facet of their existence. Too broad in descriptive context, the Islamist fundamentalist label spans the range from conservative Muslim, practicing democratic principals and interfaith dialogue, to the current leader of the al-Qa`ida organization, Ayman al Zawahiri. Wahabbism is one common term more accurately used to describe al-Qa`ida's religious foundations.[27] Wahabbism, today, most accurately reflects Saudi Arabia's conservative version of Islam, the official religion of the state. Wahabbis, however, rarely use the term and prefer instead to call themselves "Salafis."[28] Salafis believe the Companions enjoyed a pure understanding of the religion where subsequent understandings are distorted by the introduction of religious innovations, local customs, or rituals. The goal of the Salafi movement, therefore, is to eradicate innovations and return to the pure form of Islam.[29] Important to understand, al-Qa`ida only represents a small constituency of the Salafi movement; most Salafis, or Salafi reformists, condemn al Qa`ida violence, or their expression of jihad, in achieving organization objectives. Disagreements lead to internal ideological violence spurned by jihadi attacks against reformers. Also important to understand, despite this significant ideological difference, the two factions, counter-intuitively, agree on 99% of their religion.[30] The similarities mean that individual Salafis may sway from one side to the other, important for considerations of motivation for recruitment or reasons for attrition in the organization. "A relatively unknowledgeable Salafi who is frustrated, repressed, or confused my be vulnerable to the appeals of violence," according to Wiktorowicz.[31] These same individuals, or true believer recruits, may also gain affinity for al-Qa`ida's ideological interpretation for a return to pure Islam.

<u>Ideology</u>

In 2009, Peter Krause and Stephen Van Evera authored an article describing al-Qa`ida's theology as based on six elements: Salafist roots; the militarization of jihad; the elevation of jihad; the framing of vast imperial aims, and the justification for the killing of both civilians and Muslims.[32] Aside from revisiting al-Qa`ida's Salafist roots, this paper focuses on two of the author's elements in outlining al-Qa`ida ideology: Jihad and Imperial Aims. While the authors characterized the elements as part of theology, this paper presents them as ideology. The distinction is subtle but important to recognize, particularly when characterizing the present-day Salafi religious movement and the principal difference, that of violence to carry out a means, between the reform oriented Salafis and al-Qa`ida.[33]

Militarization and Elevation of Jihad: "Jihad" is the Arabic term meaning "struggle toward good" or "striving in the way of God."[34] Mainstream Muslims recognize two forms of Jihad: an internal struggle to be a good person, identified as the greater jihad, and external struggle to defend Islam against injury or attack, identified as the lesser jihad.[35] Of the two, greater jihad is considered the more important.[36] Lesser jihad requires defending Islam, by force if necessary, but includes no duty to wage an aggressive war. Al-Qa`ida inverts the Fundamentalist concepts of greater and lesser jihad by elevating the duty to defend the faith above the duty to be a good person.[37] This position militarizes the concept of jihad and vastly expands lesser jihad to include two elements not associated with mainstream Muslims: expansionist wars of aggression, and the mass killing of non-combatants and Muslims.[38]

Framing of Imperial Aims: Krause and Evera aver al-Qa`ida uses two methods to expand the lesser jihad to advocate and require aggressive war. First, al-Qa`ida

prescribes that any location ever ruled by Muslims, or to have significant Muslim

population, is a "Muslim" land to this day. Second, al-Qa`ida prescribes that if "lands are

now not governed by Muslim rulers, they are under attack and must be defended, by

force if necessary."[39] The authors conclude, "The mainstream Muslim rule against

waging aggressive war is thereby replaced by a defacto requirement to use force to

spread Muslim rule."[40]

Given this ideological approach, Leah Farrall assess al-Qa`ida's success since

2001.

> Despite nearly a decade of war, al Qaeda is stronger today than when it
> carried out the 9/11 attacks. Before 2001, its history was checkered with
> mostly failed attempts to fulfill its most enduring goal: the unification of
> other militant Islamist groups under its strategic leadership. However,
> since fleeing Afghanistan to Pakistan's tribal areas in late 2001, al Qaeda
> has founded a regional branch in the Arabian Peninsula and acquired
> franchises in Iraq and Maghreb. Today, it has more members, greater
> geographic reach, and a level of ideological sophistication and influence it
> lacked ten years ago.[41]

This does not mean, however, the al-Qa`ida of 2013 experiences no challenges in

achieving ideological aims. In May 2012, the Center for National Policy discussed the

evolving aims of al-Qa`ida, one year after Osama bin Laden was killed by U.S. Special

Forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan. One of three featured speakers, Will McCants,

considered a leading scholar on militant Islam, discussed the influence of Abu Bakr Naji.

Naji's strategy advocates long-term guerilla warfare, targeting ungoverned spaces and

eventually establishing shadow government structures supporting Islamic law. The

method of al-Qa`ida is to contest government control of areas by exhausting the

security forces and national will of the government through guerilla warfare and

subsequent expansion of territory.[42] Ironically, the Arab Spring has undermined this

strategy. According to McCants, "The Arab Spring has had huge consequences for the

resonance of al Qaeda's ideology in the region."[43] Recall that reformist Salafis and jihad Salafis largely agree on shared theology, advocating for a pure form of Islam. McCants contends Salafi Muslims (reformists) for years opted out of party politics and parliamentary systems, as seen as "usurping God's role as lawmaker."[44] He further deduces the Arab Spring has captured Salafi involvement in parliamentary politics despite a deep theological struggle with the idea. Local sheiks and religious scholars are now advocating and influencing political involvement, claiming engagement is the lesser of two evils. This religious-leader influence appears to strike at not only reformist Salafis, but also those noncommittal jihad Salafis regarding the use of violence to achieve aims.[45] For this reason, McCants speculates, the Arab Spring "strikes right at the ideological fellow travelers of al Qaeda . . . this audience is starting to have doubts, real doubts about staying completely out of politics or using violence to overthrow the government."[46] McCants further indicates nearly every al-Qa`ida statement over the previous year, May 2011 thru May 2012, discussed the consequences of the Arab Spring, warning that those governments, Muslims are forming, steal away the "fruits" of jihad "by giving it away and forming parliamentary systems of government."[47] McCants' analysis is appropriately substantiated by recent al-Qa`ida leader statements.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies published an insightful summary in its *Long War Journal* publication highlighting key elements of summer 2012 al-Qa`ida statements by leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri's written statements, interpreted by SITE Intelligence Group, outlined several "called-upon" goals for all Muslims.[48] Zawahiri claims the Muslim Ummah faces the "most vicious Crusader campaign in its history."[49] Zawahiri did not call on Muslims to strike the U.S. and instead claims "secular and

Crusader forces" are attempting to prevent Muslims from implementing sharia law.[50] To combat this supposed anti-Muslim coalition, Zawahiri argues, Muslims should first work "to liberate the occupied Muslim lands" and reject "any treaty or agreement or international resolution that grants the disbelievers the right to take over the lands of the Muslim."[51] Second, Zawahiri states Muslims should be ruled according to sharia, while rejecting all other bases for law. Zawahiri specifically rejects the "international order" and the United Nations. The remaining several goals outlined by Zawahiri focus on similar themes, calling on Muslims to "establish a Caliphate."[52] Zawahiri further claims the revolutions ushered in by the Arab Spring are unfinished. He states, Muslims must be made aware "of the necessity of being ruled by Sharia and adhering to the judgments of Islam . . . continue in their revolution until they uproot the remains of the corrupt regimes, and purify their lands of external humiliation and internal corruption."[53]

In this light, Libyans in particular remain engaged in a long-standing public debate about the proper role of Islam in public life. This specific debate culminated in violence between the Qadhafi government and armed Islamist opponents leading to the eventual overthrow of the government. Presently, the debate is taking on new urgency providing opportunity to define a new constitution. At the forefront is a sharp debate regarding strict interpretations and enforcement of sharia as a primary component of Libya's new constitution. Salafist groups with direct ties to al-Qa`ida, particularly Ansar al Sharia and Hizb al Tahir, support this position and are increasingly more organized and publically active.[54] The call to implement sharia immediately has become a common rallying cry for al-Qa`ida, as well as jihadists who are either ideologically or operationally linked to the terror group.[55] It provides a point of contrast to the Islamist governments

that have risen to power since early 2011. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for

example, has advocated a more gradual approach to implementing sharia.[56]

According to the *Long War* article, "Al Qaeda has attempted to rebrand itself in

the wake of the Arab Spring as the true defender of Islamic law."[57] In Yemen, al-Qa`ida

in the Arabian Peninsula adopted the name Ansar al Sharia as a new brand for winning

converts. Similarly, al-Qa`ida-linked organizations have risen under the Ansar al Sharia

banner elsewhere.[58]

In summary the article states, "Zawahiri's call for Muslims to implement sharia is

no accident. Al-Qa`ida's brand has been damaged after years of indiscriminate violence

inside the Muslim world and the group is attempting to remake its image as the true

protector of Islamic law." What is yet determined is whether or not al Qa`ida or affiliated

organizations will temper violence in pursuing its new ambition.[59]

Organization

In 2013, U.S. foreign policy goals remain inextricably linked to managing and

minimizing the growing threats of religious intolerance and sectarian violence, both

contributing factors to al-Qa`ida organizational growth and sustainment. During the May

2012 Center for National Policy roundtable, several perceived misunderstandings

related to al-Qa`ida's organizational structure were also addressed, revealing analysis

contrary to the 2010 NSS al-Qa`ida assessment. These contrary findings raise

questions regarding the validity or effectiveness of the US strategy approach in

defeating al-Qa`ida. Mary Habeck, from John Hopkins School of Advanced International

Studies, surmised, "when we talk about al Qaeda core and al Qaeda affiliates as two

separate things, this is actually a false dichotomy. And the two have [to] be seen as a

part of a single organization, not a movement, not a network but an organization that

had in place bylaws and all sorts of rules for dealing with succession in a way that a

network or movement would not have had."[60] Drawing on documents available from al-

Qa`ida in Iran from 2005 and 2006, and recently recovered documents from the bin

Laden raid in Abbottabad, Will McCants also elaborates on al-Qa`ida's organizational

structure; one affording a-Qa`ida affiliates the flexibility to operate independently in a

particular region, but still receiving hierarchical-level guidance from al-Qa`ida senior

leaders like Zawahiri.

> My sense of from those documents is that when al Qaeda central wants
> something done, it is couched in terms of advice, advice to their affiliates.
> And you'll notice the way in which Zawahiri, for example approaches
> Zarqawi who had been misbehaving, and he says, brother, we notice from
> afar X, Y, and Z is happening. Based on our experience in Egypt and
> around the world, we are uncomfortable with what is going on, but you, of
> course, are on the ground. We don't want to push, but can we suggest
> these things? And they leave it to Zarqawi's discretion whether to
> implement them or not.[61]

McCants' analysis suggests that core al-Qa`ida plays a significant role in establishing a

grand strategy for executing objectives, given a particular geographic region of

operations. Leah Farrall substantiates this theory: "Al Qaeda is not a traditional

hierarchical organization, with a pyramid-style organizational structure, and it does not

exercise full command and control over its branch and franchises. But, nor is its role

limited to broad ideological influence."[62] Mary Habeck adds, al-Qa'ida has demonstrated

a great deal of resiliency in the same manner of insurgencies around the world. Al

Qa`ida responds to attrition "which is the main strategy that the United States has been

following in order to combat this."[63] All this, Habeck concludes, is accomplished to

demonstrate to supporters and financiers "that they are more resilient than people take

them for, but they are in fact to fulfill their original objectives of creating, at some point,

an Islamic state."[64] On the topic of organizational resiliency and attrition, Naji's

Management of Savagery—a candid description of the need to create and manage

nationalist and religious resentment and violence in order to create long-term

propaganda opportunities for jihadist groups—also notably discusses the value of

provoking military responses by superpowers in order to recruit and train guerilla

fighters and create martyrs. Naji suggests that a long lasting strategy of attrition will

reveal fundamental weaknesses in the abilities of superpowers to defeat committed

jihadists.[65] Well-known insurgency theorist, David Kincullen, builds on Naji's suggestion:

> AQ moves into remote areas, creates alliances with local traditional
> communities, exports violence that prompts a Western intervention and
> then exploits the backlash against that intervention in order to generate
> support for its *Takfiri* agenda. Al Qa`ida's ideology tends to lack intrinsic
> appeal for traditional societies, and so draws the majority of its strength
> from this backlash, rather than from general popular support.[66]

Once al-Qa`ida has established local authority, it seeks to exploit the backlash to shift

the orientation of jihad from the local to the global. In a 2010 article, titled "Al Qaeda's

M&A Strategy," Daniel Byman, a foreign policy Senior Fellow at the Saban Center of

Middle East Policy, discusses the origins of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),

which began as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). GSPC,

rebranded AQIM, joined the ranks as an al-Qa`ida affiliate in 2006.[67] "AQIM is not alone

in going from a local to a global focus," Byman claims. He further elaborates al-Qa`ida

has systematically attempted to attract regional jihadist start-ups both reputable and

newly created, convincing them their struggle is a component of al-Qa`ida's overarching

International agenda—and vice versa.[68]

> When groups embrace al Qaeda's "far enemy" logic, they are also
> embracing strategic absurdity. Terrorist groups that succeed politically,
> like Hezbollah and Hamas, are firmly anchored in local realities and
> politics and their success comes in part because their ambitions are
> limited. Not so with al Qaeda. Al Qaeda may preach that the regimes in
> Riyadh, Cairo, and Algiers are held in place by U.S. troops and influence,

but the reality is that these governments have their own ruthless security services and means of buying off rivals that help them ensure their grip on power even if Washington abandons them.[69]

Washington by no means abandoned the Algerian government in January 2013 when a Mali-based al-Qa`ida affiliate identified as Masked Brigade, specifically targeting westerners, attacked, and held hostage, workers from a British Petroleum-operated natural gas complex in Algeria. However, per Byman's 2010 prediction, today's Algerian Army and Special Forces had no inclination to request international support or negotiate with the militants, promptly killing the militants along with numerous hostages in the rescue attempt. What unfolded in Algeria helps frame Byman's additional argument that because of the operational "risks," as experienced in Algeria, "the decision to join al-Qaeda often angers more sensible group members who retain local ambitions."[70] Byman helps summarize just how dynamic and precarious relationships are between al-Qa`ida and its affiliate organizations and potential recruits. He also underlines the importance of a balanced and carefully crafted U.S. policy in response to dealing with al-Qa`ida's principal organization, its affiliates, and local populations with varying allegiances and motivations, sliding somewhere in between.

> The most vexing dilemma for U.S. counterterrorism policy, however, concerns groups that may be moving toward al Qaeda but have not yet made the leap. Many al Qaeda affiliates always hated the United States and its allies, but their focus was local for many years. Because the groups had some ties to al Qaeda, George W. Bush's and Barrack Obama's administration began to target them and encourage others to do so. As a result, the groups became more anti-American, creating a vicious circle.[71]

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress approved the open-ended use of military force against al-Qa`ida and it's allies. In addition to activity in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Bush and Obama Administrations have used the authority to launch

15

military action, predominately drone strikes, against far-flung al-Qa`ida affiliates, including networks in Yemen and Somalia. Depending on individual perspective of current U.S. counterterrorism (CT) policy, including drone use, the effects are debatable. In January 2013, NBC World News Online reported Yemen tribal sources, and the Ministry of Defense, reported more than 10 suspected al-Qa`ida operatives were killed in a house explosion along with three others in a drone strike. The operatives, Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), are considered by Western governments as one of the most active and dangerous affiliates of the al-Qa`ida organization.[72] Physically reducing the numbers of AQAP members, therefore, is a positive end result of an attrition-based U.S. CT policy. On the other-hand, the news article further informs, "Earlier this month, dozens of armed tribesman took to the streets in southern Yemen to protest drone strikes they said killed innocent civilians and fed anger against United States."[73] In his article, Byman discusses Somalia in similar context to what is unfolding in Yemen: highlighting how U.S. involvement in the invasion and targeting of al-Qa`ida-linked individuals in Somalia intensified anger in Al-Shabab. He concludes, "In short, U.S. administrations are often damned either way. Ignoring the groups allows potential threats to grow worse and risks an attack from out of the blue. But taking them on may mean driving some deeper into al Qaeda's fold—and making the terrorist threat all the more dangerous."[74] Byman surrenders to the fact there is "no one-size-fits-all strategy" for marginalization of al-Qaida and its regional affiliates around the world; however he does argue for the implementation of a principal element of any good counterinsurgency strategy: "In all these cases, however, the United States should strive to separate the locals from the al Qaeda core."[75] It is the locals in these regions, in

many instances Salafis, as previously discussed, who teeter on the edge of joining jihad organizations and subsequently decide to remain "local" or join al-Qa`ida and pursue "global" jihad objectives. Byman concludes his article summarizing that the organization's current merger strategy is a double-edged sword: al-Qa`ida gains from its acquisitions, but can also be hurt by them.[76] Leveraging this juxtaposition, an aggressive faith-based policy provides an alternative or, minimally, a compliment to the current attrition-based U.S. policy, presently yielding short-term success but long-term adverse consequences.

<div align="center">Faith-Based Initiatives and Recommendations</div>

Framing the Problem—Solution

In a 2009 monograph providing recommendations for the Obama Administration on religious freedom policy, authors Thomas Farr and Dennis Hoover begin a chapter on counterterrorism policy stating,

> Today's most important security threat involving religion is, of course, the global terrorist/insurgent network led by Al Qaeda and its ilk. The U.S. response has been to pursue (1) hard-power approaches (military, law enforcement, and intelligence measures focusing on preventing a particular action—terrorist violence), and (2) broader efforts in conflict prevention, counterinsurgency, and democratic nation building. Unfortunately, in practice the U.S. has overemphasized the former and underemphasized the latter.[77]

The authors further suggest a "more balanced and effective approach" would employ military means as one component of a combination of all elements of national and international power. This combination, Farr and Dennis explain, must include "smart" diplomacy and solutions to the critical problems of religious and secular authority.[78] While indicating U.S. counterterrorism and democracy promotion strategies have only had "some" and "limited" success respectively, neither of these strategies integrated an

<div align="center">17</div>

appropriate focus of religion and religious freedom.[79] Three years later, in 2012, Farr

contributed to an additional monograph, authored by Timothy Shah, titled, *Religious*

Freedom. In the monograph's executive summary, the reader quickly understands that

Farr and Dennis' 2009 recommendation for a "more balanced and effective approach" in

combing elements of national power to address issues of religious authority has

lingered or largely gone ignored:

> Religious freedom is under sustained pressure today around the world. In
> some places it is fair to say that religious freedom is under siege. Although
> scant attention is paid by governments . . . the implication of the crisis—
> and we contend that it is a crisis—are quite serious. A worldwide erosion
> of religious freedom is causing large-scale human suffering, grave
> injustice, and significant threats to international peace and security.[80]

Moreover, the authors contend it is essential to recognize that a crucial contributor to

the religious radicalism giving rise to al-Qa`ida is the political repression and

manipulation of Islam endemic in many Muslim-majority societies.[81] The argument,

therefore, is if religious repression radicalizes and destabilizes, religious freedom

counter-radicalizes and stabilizes.[82] Logically then, religious freedom should be

considered an essential component in any effective long-term strategy for weakening

radical religious movements.[83]

Contributing to the paper's early definition and discussion of religion and law, the

discussion of religious freedom is explained, by Shah, as the "freedom to speak and

act—both individually and in community with others—in ways that express whatever

truths one may possess about transcendent order."[84] Furthermore, religious freedom is

explained as the right to form political parties, or to espouse public arguments, on the

basis of religious teaching.[85] The unfortunate and ugly irony to this is al-Qa`ida's

theological and ideological determined insistence that western influences and actions—

including occupation of Muslim lands, promotion of Democracy, and drone strikes killing militant Islamists—are all contributing factors to restricting the religious freedom's of jihad Salafis in accordance with their understanding and practice of pure Islam and Sharia. According to Shah, the United States is in effect hindering or removing "freedom to engage all the aspects of one's physical being to practice and manifest the truth about the unseen order of reality, and to join with others of like mind and spirit."[86] Given al-Qa`ida's indestructible vow to theology and ideology, to the degree of martyrdom, it is understandable U.S. proponents of lethal approaches, such as drone strikes or other direct action kills on al-Qa`ida key leaders and members, are the only reasonably argued methods to effectively reducing or eliminating the threat. But, such hard-power approaches, as previously highlighted by Farr and Dennis, have only achieved "some success" due largely to the organization's ability to recruit and continually to grow. Even soft-power approaches, like democracy promotion, have had "limited success."[87] A U.S. policy for successful defeat of al-Qa`ida derives from the approach of Muslims helping Muslims, and furthermore, in narrower circumstances, reformist Salafis engaging within their own communities to "rescue" those who are "frustrated, repressed, or confused" from turning to the violent means and expression of jihad. Howard Clark, former Senior Intelligence Analyst for Homeland Security's Counter Radicalization Branch, proposes "charismatic leaders, groups of friends, families, neighborhoods, mosque leaders, or inspired lone wolves, armed with emotive anti-al-Qa`ida messages may help to inspire inoculation or even active revolt against al-Qa`ida."[88] Faith-based diplomacy enables this approach and level of success and follows a key principle of counterinsurgency

operations outlined by Byman—consistent work to separate the locals from the core of al-Qaida.

Faith-based diplomacy, according to author Douglas Johnston, incorporates religious considerations into the practice of international politics. At the operational level, faith-based diplomacy makes religion part of the solution to "intractable, identity-based conflicts," escaping the reach of traditional diplomacy.[89] Johnston posits,

> A distinguishing characteristic of faith-based diplomacy is the fact that it is more about reconciliation than the absence of conflict. It is about restoring respectful relationships between the parties through a broader array of roles from those normally associated with traditional diplomacy—from impartial observer to message carrier, emphatic advocate, or activist. Common to all forms of its practice is the commitment to capitalize on the positive role that religious leaders and institutions can play in building trust and overcoming differences. They can serve as instruments of change by exercising their moral authority, their commitment to nonviolence, and their ability to inspire communities.[90]

Johnston separates those most capable and best credentialed to execute the groundwork, literally and figuratively, of a faith-based approach: "faith-based diplomacy is not well suited for government practitioners. In the West, constraints relating to separation of church and state get in the way; and elsewhere a government's political agenda inevitably compromises the kind of balanced neutrality that is normally required to succeed."[91] Thus, Johnston explains, religious leaders themselves or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), equipped for the responsibility, must take on the task. It is the government's responsibility to then reinforce the process or build upon as circumstances permit.[92] Part of reinforcing the process begins with the President setting the tone and broaching policy guidance to government organizations responsible for developing and executing faith-based diplomacy.

National Security Strategy

     First, and most importantly, the President must revise the current NSS portrayal of al-Qa`ida into a thorough, albeit succinct, and accurate representation of the organization's theology, ideology, and structure, including the dynamics and interrelationships of affiliate organizations. As the ultimate document for national security policy, the NSS provides guidance for subordinate agencies to develop supporting strategies. Accurately broadening the portrayal of al-Qa`ida—through root-cause determination and understanding of true believer and organization motivations and aims—into national-level policy and strategy documents, inherently expands the aperture of opportunities to disrupt or marginalize the organization through a faith-based diplomatic approach.

     The NSS must also emphasize the importance of promoting religious freedom worldwide. Timothy Shah argues religious freedom is an essential element in "any effective long-term strategy for weakening radical religious movements."[93] Shah further underlines the importance of this fact, indicating that many religious traditions have produced violent extremists, but twenty-first century Islamist extremism and terrorism pose one of the greatest threats to peace, security, and freedom.[94] This is a straightforward, albeit powerful, claim that easily lends credence to the advocacy and increased importance of stressing religious freedom. The influence of reformist Salafis, jihad Salafis in Libya, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Sudan, and Yemen are all locations where, according to Shah, "religious individuals and communities ardently seek public voice and social space and yet are systematically thwarted, are precisely those societies that have tended to incubate the Islamist terrorist networks threatening global stability and American security."[95]

<u>Faith-Based Approach: AQAP in Yemen</u>

AQAP in Yemen, operating as Ansar al-Sharia, has emerged as a vanguard for global jihad with committed local interests as well.[96] Christopher Swift, fellow at the University of Virginia's Center for National Security Law, recently returned from fieldwork in Yemen to examine the insurgency from a local perspective. His aims were to evaluate AQAP attempts to recruit, indoctrinate, and control the population with hopes to identify instances where tribal and religious leaders effectively resisted al-Qa`ida's advance.[97] AQAP uses incentives for recruitment, engaging local tribal leaders to help target "disaffected individuals" in exchange for wells and food in drought stricken areas. AQAP further establishes territorial control by bolstering weak sheikhs, also with incentives like manpower, money, and weapons to help the sheikhs reassert tribal authority. According to Swift, AQAP also governs occupied areas using armed militias and sharia courts to establish a "brutal yet orderly society."[98] Swift summarizes AQAP efforts in Yemen: "The group is the first Al-Qaeda franchise to successfully blend the ideological dictates of global jihad with the practical requirements of local insurgency."[99] To counter AQAP efforts, Swift recommends an overall strategy with elements mirroring the conciliatory nature of a faith-based approach. First, he recommends the United States finance Yemini efforts to mediate trial disputes using local religious organizations and NGOs in order to limit al-Qa`ida's ability "to exploit local grievances while reducing the prospect of inter-tribal conflict." This initiative also encourages sheikhs to "deny customary protection for tribesman who join AQAP, allowing other tribes to attack and expel them without fear of retaliation."[100] A further objective, as previously discussed, is mitigating the ability of AQAP to recruit jihads with a focused local agenda. Daniel Byman emphasized the importance of a balanced and carefully crafted U.S. policy in

response to dealing with al-Qa`ida's principal organization, its affiliates, and local

populations with varying allegiances and motivations.[101] Lethal approaches may

decapitate hard-core AQAP leadership, but this approach must be balanced with

diplomatic conciliatory measures, with the proportion of effort weighted to the latter. In

this context, recall David Kincullen's statement regarding the effects on local population

in response to lethal approaches; core al-Qa`ida affiliates exploit the backlash against

western intervention in order to generate support for its larger agenda. For these

reasons, Swift advocates a "light footprint" in Yemen, arguing for the empowerment of

local allies, allowing Yeminis to take credit for U.S.-backed initiatives. Swift explains, "If

Washington can approach these challenges with nuance and local insight, Yemen's

struggle against terrorism may offer a unique opportunity to defeat Al-Qaeda while

laying a stronger foundation for national reconciliation."[102]

Implementation

Per Johnston's' recommendation, it is religious leaders and well-established

NGOs who are best suited for implementing a U.S. faith-based diplomatic approach,

empowering local religious and tribal leaders.[103] There is no better government agency

equipped for this undertaking than the International Religious Freedom (IRF) Office

within the Department of State. Established in 1998, through the IRF Act, the

organization's principal aim was to strengthen U.S. advocacy on behalf of individuals

persecuted in response to violations of religious freedom in foreign countries. The Act

also established an IRF office within the State Department and ambassador-at-large

position. While the history of the IRF is beyond the scope of this paper, it does advocate

for the recent IRF-based recommendations proposed by Timothy Shah and the

Witherspoon Institute. A few specific recommendations, required to effect results and

emphasize the magnitude and importance of a faith-based approach to prevail over al-Qa`ida, include:

- Give the religious freedom function an appropriately robust status within the foreign policy community by situating the IRF ambassador-at-large within the office of the Secretary of State, reporting directly to the Secretary.[104]

- Give religious freedom policymakers sufficient resources.[105]

- Mandate, the president's letter of instruction to U.S. ambassadors, the allocation of embassy resources to engage religious actors, ideas, and communities and to advance religious freedom broadly understood.

- Support via foreign aid and democracy funding, religious and secular non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around the world that seek to advance religious freedom as part of democratic development.[106]

- Encourage the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom to continue to expand its efforts to study the effects of religious freedom on religious extremism.[107]

As previously discussed the Arab Spring has served as a springboard for democratic development and reform in many Muslim nations and has subsequently unleashed the Salafis as a new political force. Generally, the Salafis maintain they are promoting the purest alternative to the dictatorships long dominating the regions.[108] Many Muslims see it differently, however, labeling ultra-conservative Salafis as bullies who threaten others unwilling to share their rigid beliefs.[109] A faith-based diplomatic approach requires relationship building and support for individuals like Nader Bakkar, a young spokesman for Egypt's most successful Salafi party. Despite the conflicting

views, Bakkar insists his religion is not backward looking and is best exemplified in

Saudi Arabia's Salafi-run state. Importantly, however, Bakkar understands the

importance of religious freedom in forwarding his party's interests, "We cannot impose

our religious point of view, our doctrine . . . people must choose it."[110]

NGOs are also an integral part of not only advocating and implementing

programs promoting religious freedom, but also specifically providing assistance to

reform and democracy-oriented organizations able to affect or remove the influences of

al-Qa`ida on a local population. A funded NGO's work, however, regardless of whether

a faith-based organization or not, must not include proselytizing in Muslim countries,

ultimately contributing to the narrative of a Christian or western crusade against

Muslims. Lee Marsden writes: "if assistance as a component of US foreign policy is to

be delivered by faith-based and neighborhood partnerships, there needs to be strict

enforcement of the separation of Church and state, whereby US organizations that

proselytize when delivering assistance are disqualified from receiving US government

funding."[111] Failure to do so, Marsden claims, only weakens the President's objective of

building "new relationships with the Muslim-majority world," reinforcing suspicions about

U.S. intent and involvement in these regions.[112]

Conclusion

Broadly, the Qur'an views religion, as proclaimed by God's messengers, as a

human good. For the Qur'an, belief in one God, the Creator and Sustainer, is the basis

for religion and morality, and maintains people should protect this belief assiduously.[113]

This shared perspective is not that dissimilar for many of the other world religions,

believing in the commitment to and omnipotence of one God. Religious freedom

advocates for every person to use reason in seeking truth regarding whatever unseen

order of reality there may be.[114] Ironically, this freedom, in instances perceived as

divinely authorized or bestowed, gives justification, albeit severely misapplied, to

religious organizations like al-Qa`ida to reason the use of violent extremes to promote a

return to pure Islam. Moreover, al-Qa'ida has attempted to rebrand itself in the wake of

the Arab Spring as the true defender of Islamic law. Since 2001, The National Security

Strategies have inadequately or miss-portrayed al-Qa`ida through narrow discussion of

its theological, ideological, and organizational elements. As a result, the U.S. has

engaged in a lingering war of attrition through lethal means, ultimately creating a local

population backlash al-Qa`ida strategy depends upon for recruitment and overall

support of its ideological strategic aims. The President should revise the NSS, to include

a shift in policy from an existing focus of effort exploiting lethal methods to a diplomatic

faith-based approach. A faith-based approach must include a significant focus on the

promotion of religious freedom and the use of local religious organizations, leaders and

NGOs to aid in marginalizing al-Qa`ida's ability to influence or coerce local populations.

Endnotes

[1] Sheherazade Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy Online," *Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 1 (Fall 2007), in ProQuest (accessed December 4, 2012).

[2] *The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life*, http://www.pewforum.org/global-relgious-landscape-exec.aspx (accessed January 5, 2013).

[3] Lindsay Jones, ed., *Encyclopedia of Religion*, Vol. 11. 2nd ed. (Detroit, MI: Macmillan Reference, 2005).

[4] Peter W. Edge, *Religion and Law* (United Kingdom: Oxford Brooks University, 2006), 28.

[5] Ibid., 29.

⁶ Ibid., 32.

⁷ Jafari, "Local Religious Peacemakers: An Untapped Resource in U.S. Foreign Policy."

⁸ *Defense Department*, http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf (accessed January 5, 2013).

⁹ Alice Chasan, " Why Faith-Based Diplomacy Matters," 2006, http://www.beliefnet.com/News/Peace/Why-Faith-Based-Diplomacy-Matters.aspx (accessed January 5, 2013).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of The United States of America Online* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/ (accessed January 5, 2013).

¹² Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Global Jihad: Understanding September 11* (Falls Church, VA: Sound Room Publishers, Inc., 2002), 1.

¹³ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 5.

¹⁷ Bush, *The National Security Strategy of The United States of America Online.*

¹⁸ Barack H. Obama, The National Security Strategy Online (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 2010) http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed January 6, 2013).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Howard Gambrill Clark, *Revolt Against Al-Qa`ida* (United States: Light of New Orleans Publishing, 2010) 15.

²¹ Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer* (New York, NY: Perennial Classics, 2002), 12.

²² Thomas Farr and Dennis R. Hoover, *The Future of U.S. International Religious Freedom Policy* (United States: Bright Yellow Jacket, 2009) 39.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

[25] The second source of Islam is the Sunna, or the path of the prophet Mohammed, a compilation of stories about the sayings and actions of the prophet. Wiktorowicz, *Global Jihad*, 6.

[26] Ibid.

[27] The term refers to the ideology of Abdul Wahab, an 18th century theologian who helped found the original state of Saudi Arabia. Abdul Wahab was a strict and literal adherent to the Quran and Sunna. Ibid., 7.

[28] This term derives from the Arabic *Salaf*, referring to the Companions of the Prophet Mohammed, generally including the first three generations of Muslims who learned about Islam from the Prophet or those who knew him. Ibid.

[29] As recent example, al-Qa`ida operatives in Mali systematically destroyed aboveground century-old mausoleums because they contain the remains of people considered saints in the Sufi religion. Terry Gross, "Northern Mali: A Violent Islamist Stronghold," January, 3, 2013, linked from NPR Home Page at "Fresh Air," http://www.npr.org/2013/01/13/168483341/norhtern-mail-a-viloent-islamist-stronghold (accessed January 30, 2013).

[30] Ibid.,10.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Peter Krause and Stephen Van Evera, "Public Diplomacy: Ideas for The War of Ideas." *Middle East Policy* 16, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 106, in ProQuest (accessed December 5, 2012).

[33] As previously discussed, the difference between theology and ideology, in the context of religious legitimacy, is largely determined by an organization's self-actualized perception of its own beliefs. Webster defines theology as the study of religious faith, practice, and experience; *especially* the study of God and of God's relation to the world." Furthermore, Webster defines ideology as "manner or the content of thinking characteristic of an individual, group, or culture" and additionally as "the integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a sociopolitical program." Given the two definitions, this paper consigns the meaning of theology to describing the ninety-nine percent stable similarities between the Salafi reformists and al-Qa`ida and consigns the meaning of ideology to al-Qa`ida's minority interpretation and acceptance of the use of violence to further its objectives.

[34] Krause, "Public Diplomacy," 115.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Leah Farrall, "How al Qaeda Works: What the Organizations Subsidiaries Say About Its Strength," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011): 128, in ProQuest (accessed December 5, 2012).

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] SITE is an Intelligence Group focusing on research and analysis of terrorist networks, including monitoring jihadist propaganda, studying trends within the online jihadist community, and understanding how jihadist groups utilize the Internet.

[49] Thomas Joscelyn, "Zawahiri call on Muslims to implement sharia," November 13, 2012, linked from *The Long War Journal Home Page* at "Archives for LWJ," http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/al_qaeda_has_release.php (accessed December 15, 2012).

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Christopher M. Blanchard, *Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 18, 2012), 6.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Additionally, Mohammed al Zawahiri, Ayman's younger brother, is one of several al-Qa`ida-linked jihadists who called upon the Brotherhood to set aside all forms of law other than sharia, which is often poorly defined."[56] During a recent interview with Cairo's Al Masry al Youm, the younger Zawahiri was asked what he wants Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi to do. "I demand [that Morsi] and all Muslims to hold on to Allah's creed, to be pious, to know that they are accountable, to strive to avoid the forbidden and to apply Islamic Sharia," Mohammed al Zawahiri responded. Sharia "has the solution to all our problems." Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Habeck, "A Year Beyond Bin Laden."

[61] Ibid.

[62] Farrall, "How al Qaeda Works," 33.

[63] Habeck, "A Year Beyond Bin Laden."

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid.

[66] David Kincullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), 34.

[67] Daniel Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy," December 7, 2010, linked from *The Brooking Institute Home Page* at "Research," http://brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/12/07-al-qaeda-byman (accessed January 12, 2013).

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Mohammed Ghobari, "Al-Qaida-linked militants killed by drone strike in Yemen," January 20, 2013, linked from the *NBC World News Home Page* at "News," http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/20/16608301-al-qaida-linked-militants-killed-by-drone-strike-in-yemen (Accessed on January 21, 2013).

[73] Ibid.

[74] Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy."

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Farr, "*The Future," 37.*

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid., 38.

[80] Timothy Samuel Shah, *Religious Freedom: Why Now? Defending an Embattled Human Right* (Princeton, NJ: The Witherspoon Institute Inc., 2012) v.

[81] Ibid., 65.

[82] Ibid., 56

[83] Ibid.

[84] Ibid., 17.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Farr, "The Future," 38.

[88] Clark, *Revolt Against Al-Qa`ida*, 45.

[89] Douglas M. Johnson, Jr., *Religion, Error and Terror* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2011), 56.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid., 57.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Shah, *Religious Freedom,* 56.

[94] Ibid.*,* 55.

[95] Ibid., 63.

[96] Christopher Swift, "Next step to defeating Al-Qaeda is in Yemen Online," *Yemen Times*, June 25, 2012 in LexisNexis (accessed January 25, 2013).

[97] Ibid.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Byman, "Al Qaeda's M&A Strategy."

[102] Swift, "Next step to defeating Al-Qaeda."

[103] Johnston, *Religion, Terror, and Error*, 57.

[104] According to Shah, "No American administration has given the IRF ambassador-at-large the authority, status or resources necessary to accomplish the mission. The ambassador should be situated in the office of the Secretary of State, and should report to the Secretary. . . .

Elevating the status of the IRF ambassador will communicate to foreign officials and American officials alike that the United States gives a high priority to the advancement of international religious freedom." Shah, *Religious Freedom,* 72.

[105] According to Shah, "The United States Congress has not provided independent appropriations for the ambassador-at-large for international religious freedom or for the ambassador's office. This has severely restricted the ability of the ambassador to develop strategies that can be successful." Shah, *Religious Freedom,* 73.

[106] In a separate email interview, Thomas Farr also indicated "the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should hold a major oversight hearing on the operation of the 1998 IRFA." He stated no such hearing has ever occurred and in doing so would communicate to the State Department and the administration that Congress is serious about IRF policy. Thomas Farr, email interview by author, March 1, 2013.

[107] Ibid., 74.

[108] Leila Fadel, "Egypts Salafis Emerge As Powerful And Controversial Political Force," January 28, 2013, linked from NPR Home Page at "Morning Edition," http://www.npr.org/2013/01/28/169974295/egypt-s-salafis-emerge-as-powerful-and-controversial-politcal-force (accessed January 30, 2013).

[109] Ibid.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Lee Marsden, "Bush, Obama and a faith-based U.S. foreign policy," *International Affairs* 88, no. 5 (2012): 974, in ProQuest (accessed December 5, 2012).

[112] Ibid.

[113] Shah, *Religious Freedom,* 41.

[114] Shah, Religious Freedom, 17.